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To think minorities as ‘difference’ is to reduce them to their fusion 
with…their difference from the State, conceiving of them as stato-
minoritarian mixtures, as modes or projections of power relations, profits 
and losses of an indefatigable grind – history. The other thought, properly 
minoritarian and no longer statominoritarian, radicalizes the conditions of 
the problem. It asks what would minorities be who would not form an 
additional universal – the intersection of the great authoritarian universals, 
Language, Sex, Culture, Desire, Power? Who would be par excellence real 
or formed of individuals as they are? (33) 
 
François Laruelle has rightfully earned the title of contemporary French 
philosophy’s archetypical heretic, having fostered the “non-standard” method of univocal 
genericity and spurred an altogether radical praxis, inciting a new generation of loyal 
followers that include Jason Barker and Ray Brassier. Laruelle’s method, often referred to 
as “non-philosophy” (though “non-philosophy” is an abbreviation of “non-standard 
philosophy”), withdraws from the metaphysical precept of separating the world into 
binarisms, perhaps epitomized by the formative division between “universals” and 
“particulars” in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. Laruelle’s method also rejects the 
“evental” nature of Being described by Heiddegger as the foundation for philosophy's 
“standard model,” which Heidegger termed Ereignis (often translated as “the event of 
Appropriation”). In its immanence, Laruelle’s “One” is understood as generic identity - 
an identity/commonality that reverses the classical metaphysics found in philosophy’s 
bastion thinkers (a lineage that runs from Plato to Badiou), where the transcendental is 
upheld as a necessary precondition for grounding reality. Instead, Laruelle asserts the 
“One” as the immanent real: generic, non-philosophical and axiomatic. 
  Drawing on The Minority Principle (1981) and Struggle and Utopia: At the End Times 
of Philosophy (2012), Laruelle further cultivates his project on generic ethics and axiomatic 
principles with his latest text, A Biography of an Ordinary Man: On Authorities and Minorities 
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(2018). From the very beginning of the book, Laruelle stakes a “revolt against 
philosophers” (1) and, in particular, against philosophy’s historical hostage of the “ethical 
Other” – staking a cause against philosophy’s “warp and weft of games of power,” which 
all too often reduce marginalized individuals and collectives to terms of “difference” (32). 
Laruelle, with great detailed prowess, surveys the excesses shoring the discipline of 
philosophy. Captivated with “revealing” and “reflection,” Laruelle charges philosophy 
with increasingly moving towards a dominion stilted on dialectics, metaphysics, and 
Derridian différance at the expense of the Real. Where immanence does transpire in 
philosophical discourse, it is almost always tied to the Deleuzian plane of multiplicitous 
immanence. For Laruelle, this is far too weak. With the exception of speculative realism 
and object-oriented ontology, a quick canvas of contemporary philosophy evinces the 
terms of Laruelle’s polemics: Slavoj Žižek’s dialectic approach is indebted to Hegelian 
synthesis; Catherine Malabou’s work on plasticity is contingent on Kantian 
“correlationism”; Michel Serres and Bernard Stiegler both rely on the aperture of 
transcendence. 
Thus, not only is Kant’s transcendental deduction looming in Laruelle’s 
foreground but so, too, is Deleuze’s ethics (of “becoming-minor”). In A Biography of 
Ordinary Man, Laruelle tasks “non-ethics” with devolving “individual causality,” the sole 
content of the “Real essence” (225). With one swift move, Laruelle’s univocal immanence 
superimposes the (Kantian) analytic a priori as the Real before moving on to confront the 
true subject of this book – to poise a more precise and rigid means of working with 
science within the interior of philosophy. Laruelle proposes a terrain whereby science 
ceases to be a “techno-political fantasy” and becomes “a real science,” whereby “man 
must be irreducible in his multiplicity if he is no longer to be this anthropological fetish” 
(2). Consequentially, Laruellean ethics is radically de-anthropocentrized, fundamentally 
directed towards a universalized, auto-effective set of generic conditions.  
Laruelle takes up the responsibility of describing socio-political relations between 
minority and the state via causality and politico-logical terms, rather than traditional 
ontological terms of Foucauldian power. For those initiated within the structuralist 
discourse of Foucault and Althusser, Laruelle’s theses on “Authority” and “the State” are 
riveting reversals that upend post-structuralist proclivities: Laruelle transfigures 
Foucault’s “conditions of possibility for knowledge” by directing them towards the 
generic conditions of the a priori. Rather than the hackneyed platitude “we are (configured 
by) the State,” Laruelle offers that “We are minorities, they are us.... Thinking is beginning 
with real individuals in order to go towards the State.... It is necessary to 'invert' or rather 
unilateralize the World and the State...so that thought finds its real basis” (40-41). For 
Laruelle, “Authorities” are the aprioristic structures predicating experience in the “World, 
History, and State” via “Games of power,” which pose “real essences” and “onto-logical” 
content. A generic world – a truly Laruellean world – is conditioned by immanence of 
identity rather than ontological difference. 
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Laruelle's use of “science” is unconventional and possibly perplexing for readers 
devoid of a primer. For Laruelle, the domain of “Absolute science” belongs to “ordinary 
man rather than to the philosopher” (151), where “minority” or “ordinary” indexes that 
which pervades the world and individual (the fold of the general condition). Laruelle's 
text is undoubtedly political but, for those readers expecting the utilitarian Marxism of 
Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, they will not find “the Revolution” here; rather, A 
Biography of Ordinary Man prefigures resistance - it is, as Laruelle notes, essentially a “pre-
revolutionary, pre-activist, anterior to struggles” (25). 
This is not to insinuate that Laruelle’s book is composed of nebulous postulates 
– non-philosophy’s foes are taken up in full. In addition to Deleuze and Kant, Laruelle 
complicates “being-in-the-world” as described in Heidegger’s “phenomenologico-
existential sense” (127), which privileges the methodologies of hermeneutics and 
interpretation. Laruelle’s principle of “the One,” rather than some decision or identity, is 
a postural withdrawal from the philosophical “auto-position” of distance between the 
Real and Being – instead, the two are interminably folded over one-another. Laruelle’s 
“One” is diametrically opposed to Heidegger’s “world of authentic presence” and 
“unconcealement,” where truth is stilted on exchange.  
What uniquely colors A Biography of Ordinary Man from Laruelle’s prolific output 
over the last few decades is that this project is framed not only in epistemic terms but, 
primarily, through the ethical lens that invigorates the “non” in “non-philosophy.” 
Laruelle’s unilateral “One” resists any concentration of power by affect, genealogy, or 
history; unlike Foucault's project, which - in the structuralist-archaeological tradition - 
opposes and exchanges animal madness (folie) with human madness (déraison), Laruelle 
pitches the “nonstandard human” to underscore the quantum nature of a generic primary 
of pure immanence. Such radical immanence is “no longer exactly a relation, that is, a 
reciprocity or a reversibility, or even a relativity” (17) – in fact, it could be said that Laruelle 
opposes what we conceive of as “the political” with “the purely ethical” as, for Laruelle, 
that which is ethical is not a system of laws but, rather, axiomatic genericity. Thus, Laruelle 
refuses to revitalize the minority discourse proffered by the State, in favor of a trans-
species generic category (hence, Laruelle’s penchant for lifting algebraic principles and 
plucking quantum mechanics).  
By problematizing what he terms “The Statist Ideal,” or the “Unitary Illusion” - 
be it negative (Hegel) or positive (Nietzsche) - Laruelle interrogates the “scission” of the 
minority subject, which he contends is a “symptom” of the Western dialectic practice 
(64). In opposition to the Kantian first principles upon which both Continental and 
Analytic philosophy rest, Laruelle attempts to sketch a “real Critique of Reason” that is 
determined in itself and through itself; insofar as this involves Laruellean “non-ethics,” 
this involves breaking from the long-situated practice of studying the State from the 
paralogism of the State view, itself.  
Laruelle's A Biography of Ordinary Man is systematically split into four subsections: 
“Who Are Minorities?,” “Who are Authorities?,” “Ordinary Mysticism,” and, lastly, 
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“Ordinary Pragmatics.” Throughout, Laruelle proposes a unique system of “non-ethics,” 
as philosophical ethics has undermined the negotiation of morality by insisting on a 
preliminary a priori recognition of “philosophical positioning,” authoritatively rendering 
ethics under history, world, or state. For Laruelle, ethics is (improperly) philosophically 
founded in “Greek ontological prejudices” (6), “mystico-religious” dualisms, and 
Christian “gnoses,” which orient “experience as a quasispatial insertion into the World 
and as a topography” (80). 
What alternative, then, does Laruelle pose? A Biography of Ordinary Man furthers 
Laruelle’s post-Althusserian Marxism and, consequently, his long-spanning literature on 
the “determination in the last instance” (DLI), Laruelle's uniquely unidirectional and 
rigorously irreversible causality, which he also terms “cloning.” Thus, before further 
explaining Laruelle’s idiosyncratic verbiage, I ought to note that A Biography of Ordinary 
Man is a book that unforgivingly makes use of the terms Laruelle has collectively 
accumulated throughout his philosophical career. To those approaching Laruelle for the 
first time, I advise beginning elsewhere, such as with Principles of Non-Philosophy (1996) and 
Future Christ (2002), while complementing these preliminary readings with those of 
secondary commentators including Alexander Galloway’s brilliant monogram, Laruelle: 
Beyond the Digital (2014), and John Ó Maoilearca's non-philosophy primer All Thoughts Are 
Equal (2015). Otherwise, the neophyte reader will not only be weighed by seemingly 
obscure Laruellean language but also risk glossing over otherwise truly exhilarating 
minutiae.  
Categorizing Laruelle as a Marxist may, also, seem folly - after all, Laruelle's 
project is to unmoor the “fully accounted” capture of history from the “bastard sciences” 
(4) of mytho-philosophical ambition, as exemplified by ethnology, linguistics, biology, 
Greco-Christian anthropology, psychoanalysis and even Marx's “science of history” (1). 
For Laruelle, identifying with any genealogy of the “Sciences of Man” evinces that they 
stem from the same archaic, metaphysical presuppositions. Laruelle seeks to establish a 
rigorous “science of man” that no longer borrows from other sciences, refuting the 
“purely passive and static genesis” of Marxist structuralism (112). Nonetheless, Laruelle 
is a Marxist, despite what one may glean from any surface-level review; in A Biography of 
Ordinary Man, his anticapitalist project appropriates Althusserian “determination in the 
last instance” so as to prohibit the necessity of “relations of exchange” (136). 
Laruelle's tactical use of Althusser's DLI is perhaps best elaborated in his 
“Theorem 2. Minorities determine Authorities in the last instance, who do not determine 
them in return.” While Laruelle’s book makes liberal use of such edicts and theorems, this 
is quite possibly the most important, for it preconfigures Laruelle's “Minority Principle,” 
which requires that the “authentic minority, that is individuality, be laid bare and decide 
to think through itself” (33). Thus, unlike Deleuze - who has traditionally appointed 
cinema and the arts with the responsibility to facilitate the representation of a “missing 
people,” Laruelle's ethical position posits “The ordinary individual experiences his reality 
and thinks for himself, in the radical finitude of his essence as inherent (to) himself: he is 
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for himself an immediate given” (76). Laruelle advocates for creative and inventive auto-
impression, devoid of mediation, be it interpersonal or intertextual.  
While Laruelle’s “non-philosophy” (and, in this book, “non-ethics”) certainly 
commits to a mutiny of past methodology, it would be blindsided to claim that Laruelle’s 
book is unrelated to the late Michel Henry’s notion of “auto-affective Life” and to the 
Nietzschean sensibility of “active forces.” However, Laruelle radicalizes Henry by 
elbowing auto-affection towards the non-human terrain, effectively universalizing it and 
reconfiguring the concept from the transcendental by transubstantiating it as constant 
mutation.  
Laruelle's past approaches materialized science via the aporetics of “anti-
philosophy” with utopic vigor - his newest book is no exception. Whereas ethics 
traditionally disorients itself from the real and philosophy is based on spatial distance, 
Laruelle’s “non-ethics” is confrontational in its compressive tactility, unwrenching these 
tenets from their histories. For those interested in animal ethics, cyborg theory, and the 
anthropocene, I highly recommend this text as Laruelle deftly displaces any notion of a 
“Humanity Principle,” equating it with the “Power Principle, the Language Principle, the 
Pleasure Principle” (10).  
For Laruelle, all philosophy is performance and, consequently, under philosophy 
the domain of political ethics is derived from a point of extension and the Other, within 
the scope of “Pragmatic Reason” (184). One could say that, as Althusser once professed 
that Reading Capital could be best understood by those precariat workers in the factory, 
thereby expanding theory’s “knowledge effects,” Laruelle’s non-ethics - in its polemic 
proposition - seeks to broaden philosophy by mutating ethics in the hands of the generic. 
It is mirthless to seek a revolutionary ethos in Laruelle – his critique solely provides us 
with the appropriate tools and, in this case, the ethics with which to problematize 
philosophy. Laruelle’s contemporaries, such as his anarcho-Maoist student, Gilles Grelet, 
have weaponized Laruelle to radicalize non-philosophy and pose an anti-
phenomenological practice. A Biography of Ordinary Man furthers the conversation towards 
an ethical terrain, allotting a unique admixture of non-humanist interventions – how to 
apply these “non-ethics” is now within the reader’s sphere.  
 
